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COMMENTS
LITERARY PROPERTY AND CONTRACTS OF HIRE
It is a general rule that the owner of literary property is the person who
is entitled to copyright it.1 Often times, either as the main purpose of an
employment or merely as incidental to the employment, literary work is
produced which is of such quality or character that there is real monetary
value in the privilege of being able to exploit it. A dispute usually occurs
when either the employer or the author copyrights the work, and, in an
attempt to publish it, is faced with an injunction suit or an infringement
suit brought by the other party or an assign of the other party. Thus, if a
person's right to literary property is traced through a contract of em-
ployment, he must search for a rule of law upon which to justify his title.
Working on the principle that an idea is still in possession of the author
until he voluntarily divulges it, the common law protected the literary
efforts of the author up until the time of the first publication. 2 Once pub-
lished, his intellectual labors were free to the world.3 With the aim of
giving the author and his assigns some measure of reward beyond this
common law right of first publication, the copyright laws, acting under
constitutional mandate, secured to these people a monopoly as to publica-
tion for a period of two terms of 28 years each. 4 The law was not passed
for the purpose of changing any common law rights, but was to extend
those rights beyond the first publication. Thus, though the copyright
laws are purely statutory, the dealings with the literary property that
determine the ownership of the common law right and subsequently the
copyright itself are governed by the common law. This is illustrated by
the broad terms used in the copyright statute as to who is entitled to
copyright. Only such people as the "author or proprietor of any work
made the subject of copyright; or his executors, administrators, or assigns,
shall have copyright. . .."
At common law, under certain circumstances, the master was entitled
to the literary property produced by his servant. In a sense, since such an
employer is neither the author, nor the assign of his servant who is the
author (because in such circumstance the servant never owned the lit-
' Werkmeister v. Springer Lithographing Co., 63 Fed. 808 (C.C.N.Y., 1894); Ger-
lack-Barlow Co. v. Morris, 23 F. 2d 159 (C.C.N.Y., 1927).
2 Carew v. Melrose Music, 92 F. Supp. 971 (D.C.N.Y., 1950).
3 Taylor v. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios, 115 F. Supp. 156 (S.D. Cal., 1953).
4 35 Stat. 1080 (1909), as amended, 17 U.S.C.A. § 24 (1952).
535 Stat. 1077 (1909), as amended, 17 U.S.C.A. § 9 (1952).
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erary property), the copyright law provided that "the word 'author' shall
include an employer in the case of works made for hire." The obvious
purpose of this was to make the statute conform even more to the com-
mon law rules as to the ownership of the literary property, and to avoid
the intolerable situation where the employer might own the common law
right of first publication and the employee, because he is the actual author,
might own the right to copyright the work. It must be noted here that
ownership of the literary property and the subsequent right to copyright
are incorporeal rights entirely distinct from the ownership of the physi-
cal manuscript; 7 and, because of this peculiarity, it is quite common for
the ownership of each to be in two different people. Thus, in the problem
at hand, the employer might own and have in his possession the only
manuscript of his employee, and still not be entitled either to publish or
to copyright it, because the literary property has remained in the em-
ployee-author.
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
Keeping in mind that in respect to the ownership of literary property,
the intent of the copyright law was not to change the auhor or owner's
rights8 but to extend them beyond the first publication, the common law
rule was that the employer is entitled to all the literary property of his
employee that is either expressly or impliedly given to him by the con-
tract of employment. 9 There is no presumption by the mere fact that the
author is in the general employ of a person that the employer is to own
such literary effort. It must be remembered that when the act saw fit to
designate employer as being synonymous with author, the framers distin-
guished an employer from an assign, and interpreted the employer as
being the owner of the literary property from the very beginning of its
existence without the need of any act of assignment on the part of the
actual author.10 They saw the employee as being a tool in the hand of the
employer, and that in actuality the employer was the real author in law."
So, when the act speaks of the employer as being the author, it contem-
plates a contract of hire whereby the employer is to exercise some degree
of control over the actions of the employee. Thus, it has been held that
the employer of an independent contractor is as a matter of right not
6 35 Stat. 1087, 17 U.S.C.A. § 26 (1952).
7 American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907); Stephens v. Cady,
14 How. (U.S.) 528 (1852).
8 Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196 (C.A. 2d, 1896).
9 Boucicault v. Fox, 3 Fed. Cas. 977, No. 1,691 (C.C.N.Y., 1862).
10 Edward Thompson Co. v. Clark, 109 N.Y.S. 700 (1904).
11 Von Tilzer v. Vogel Music Co., 53 F. Supp. 191 (D.C.N.Y., 1943), aff'd 158 F.
2d 516 (C.A. 2d, 1946).
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entitled to the literary property in the notes and work sheets of such in-
dependent contractor.12 Though there are few cases that dwell on this
distinction, it is a definite and a logical one.
There is no doubt that when a contract of employment expressly pro-
vides that the literary property or the copyright will be in the employer,
that the law will give the contract that effect.13 In such case no later
assignment or any act on the employee's part is needed to vest such prop-
erty in the employer. The employer at all times can sue for infringement,
assign his rights, or later copyright the work. It is when the contract of
employment is silent upon the subject of ownership of literary property
that trouble is encountered and it is here where the court must interpret
the intent of the parties. Since we are concerned with the ownership of
the literary property before copyright, the contract of employment may
be entirely oral,14 and interpretation will depend mostly on the facts and
circumstances of the case.
Where the employee is employed for the sole purpose of producing the
literary product, the presumption is that the parties intended the literary
propery and the right to copyright to be in the employer. In such case,
by proving the employment and the fact that its purpose was to produce
the literary effort, the employer has satisfied any burden of proof that he
is the owner.'5 Two elements that seem to be necessary to constitute the
type of employment needed to produce this result are some right to con-
trol or supervise the efforts of the employee and the obligation to com-
pensate the employee for his labors. If the employee's services were to be
rendered during certain hours of the day, on the employer's premises, and
with the employer's materials, the presumption is that much stronger that
the parties intended the literary property to vest in the employer as soon
as it came into existence.
Where literary property is created as an incident to the main purpose
of the employment, or in the course of a general as opposed to a specific
employment, the problem is the same, namely, to interpret whether the
intention of the parties in entering the contract of employment was that
the employer should have the literary property. However, in this type
case, there are no presumptions to aid the employer. In the early case of
12 Ipswich Mills v. William Dillon, 260 Mass. 453, 157 N.E. 604 (1927).
13Edward Thompson Co. v. Clark, 109 N.Y.S. 700 (1904).
14 Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888).
15 In Phillips v. W.G.N., Inc., 307 Ill. App. 1, 11, 29 N.E. 2d 849, 858 (1940) it was
said "That which he has been employed and paid to accomplish becomes, when accom-
plished, the property of his employer." Other cases exemplifying this are: Bliestein v.
Donaldson Lithographing, 188 U.S. 239 (1903); Colliery Engineer Co. v. U.S. Corre-
spondence Schools, 94 Fed. 152 (C.C.N.Y., 1889).
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Boucicault v. Foxx6 and its twin case, Roberts v. Myers,17 Boucicault, who
had been employed as an actor and stage hand, orally agreed to write a
play for his employer as well as to act in it. Later, after terminating his
relationship, Boucicault brought suit to enjoin the continuing performance
of his work. In rejecting the defense of the producer that he, as the
former employer of the plaintiff, was the owner of the literary property
in the play, the court said:
A man's intellectual productions are peculiarily his own, and although they
may have been brought forth by the author while in the general employ of
another, yet he will not be deemed to have parted with his right and trans-
ferred it to his employer, unless a valid agreement to that effect is adduced.18
At approximately the same time as these two cases were handed down,
the case of Keene v. Wheatley"9 promulgated a seemingly contrary rule.
Therein it was held that if the literary property is an outgrowth of one of
the duties of the general employ, the literary property will be in the em-
ployer. In actuality, these apparently divergent views represent two at-
tempts to apply the same rule, namely, that the ownership of the literary
property will be determined by the contract of employment, and if such
contract is silent on the subject, then the ownership will be deemed to
have vested or remained in the author. The main difference between the
two cases lies in how impressed the courts were with the common law
idea that the right of first publication is an incorporal right reserved ex-
clusively to the author, that it is almost a personal right which should not
see the light of day in anyone but the person who does the labor that gave
birth to it unless there is clear convincing evidence of an intent in the
contract to relinquish that right to another. The one court followed that
idea to its fullest, while the other court seemed to place more emphasis on
the problem of who, as between the employer and employee, is entitled to
the labor that produced the literary property, resolving in the end that
since the employer is entitled to the actual physical and mental work of
his employee, he ought to have the resultant literary fruits of that work.
Thus, we have two rules, one which contemplates literary property as
being more of a personal right in the author, and the other which sees
literary property as being inseparable from the labor which produces it.
While the courts in the later cases do not seem to express either view in
interpreting the contracts of the parties, the latter view, that if the
employer by the terms of the employment contract is entitled to the
actual labor which produced the literary property, he also is deemed to
be entitled to the literary property, seems to be about the most consistent
18 3 Fed. Cas. 977, No. 1,691 (C.C.N.Y., 1862).
17 20 Fed. Cas. 898, No. 11,906 (C.C.Mass, 1860).
18 3 Fed. Cas. 977, 980, No. 1,691 (C.C.N.Y., 1860).
19 14 Fed. Cas. 80, No. 7,644 (C.C. Pa., 1861).
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theory in explaining the later decisions. This is illustrated by the modern
case of Sawyer v. Crowell Pub. Co.20 Here the plaintiff while employed
as Assistant Secretary of Interior had prepared and copyrighted a map
while on a junket to Alaska. In defending a suit for infringement, the
defendant maintained that since the map was prepared while on a govern-
ment mission in connection with his duties, the literary property was in
the government, and that the plaintiff was not the proper party to sue. The
court allowed this defense and decided that the copyright, while valid, is
held in trust for the government. To explain this decision by saying the
plaintiff impliedly agreed, when he accepted his post, to the government's
ownership of any literary property which he might produce in connec-
tion with his employment, is to indulge in a fiction. Obviously, when he
prepared and copyrighted the maps he had no such intention, and most
likely when he entered the contract, neither he nor the government even
foresaw such a situation. The true rule is that the literary property will go
to the one who is entitled to the labor. 21
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
Independent contractors in the field of literary property present a very
special situation. Such contracts are not contracts of employment within
the meaning of "employers in the case of works for hire" in the copy-
right statute, but more properly fit into the category of contracts for a
future assignment. The most classic example of an independent contractor
occurs in the commission of an artist to paint a portrait.22 As a general
rule, the person who hires an artist is interested only in the results of the
contract, a finished portrait. He exercises little or no control over the
technique of the artist, usually does not furnish the artist with the mate-
rials, and pays him a lump sum for the finished product without regard
for the time the artist expends in painting the portrait. In fact, unless
there is a violation of some personal right, it can not even be said that the
person who commissions the artist has any rights in preliminary sketches
or even an unfinished portrait. As to the finished portrait the proper
remedy to recover it would be specific performance. The one confusing
pitfall in this situation is the analogy with the photographer cases, where
it has been held that the person who hires and sits for a photographer is
2046 F. Supp. 471 (D.C.N.Y., 1942), aff'd 142 F. 2d 497 (C.A. 2d, 1944), cert. denied
323 U.S. 735 (1944).
21 Cases that follow this idea are: Brown v. Moll6, 20 Supp. 135 (D.C.N.Y., 1937);
U.S. Ozone Co. v. U.S. Correspondence Schools, 62 F. 2d 881 (C.A. 7th, 1932); Nat.
Cloak and Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189 Fed. 215 (C.A. Pa., 1911).
22 E.g., Esquire v. Varga Enterprises, 185 F. 2d 14 (C.A. 7th, 1950); Yardley v. Hough-
ton Mifflin Co., 108 F. 2d 28 (C.A. 2d, 1939), cert. denied 309 U.S. 686 (1942); Crimi v.
Rutgers Pres. Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S. 2d 813 (S.Ct., 1949). Contra: Schumacher
v. Schwencke, 25 Fed. 466 (C.C.N.Y., 1885).
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entitled to all the prints and the negatives resulting from the contract, and
also is entitled to enjoin the publication of such pictures. 23 While these
decisions may pay lip service to the idea that the literary property is in
the sitter, the real foundation of these cases is the personal right of
privacy. 24 In truth, an artist is an independent contractor in the real sense
of the term, just as much so as is a doctor or a lawyer.
The rule in the artist cases is that when the pictures are finished and
delivered, all literary property passes unless expressly reserved to the
artist. Before delivery or at some other time pointed out in the contract
as the time when the property should pass, the contracting party has no
rights in the literary or physical property other than that afforded by
specific performance. 25
Going over to the position of the author, although few cases raise this
distinction, there does not seem to be any reason why an author might not
occupy the status of an independent contractor. Where the author is un-
der a contract to produce a literary work of a general kind, and no right
of control or supervision is reserved, compensation being based upon the
delivery of the finished product, it seems that such an author would be an
independent contractor. As in the case of an artist, the employer would
have no rights in the preliminary drafts or the manuscript other than spe-
cific performance. If the author refuses to assign or deliver, the contract-
ing party would have no right to publish or to copyright, since he would
neither be an author, proprietor, or assign within the meaning of the
copyright statute.20 The best case on the subject of the rights against an
independent contractor in the field of written material is the case of
Ipswich Mills v. Dillon,27 where it was held that a party who employs an
accounting firm to do an audit has no rights to the data and work sheets
of the firm because of the fact that the contract employed the defendant
on the basis of an independent contractor. A case handed down a year
later, Anderson v. Baldwin Law Publishing Co.,28 held that where the state
employs a firm to report and to publish its judicial decisions for less than
the cost of the work, the firm is an independent contractor, and as such is
deemed to own the literary property. The court said:
An author is not necessarily precluded from copywriting a work produced
under contract with another person. . . . Where a contract is silent, there
28 Lumiere v. Robertson-Cole, 280 Fed. 550 (C.A. 2d, 1922).
2 4 For an enlightening discussion see Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 Harv. L.R. 193 (1890).
25 Esquire v. Varga Enterprises, 185 F. 2d 14 (C.A. 7th, 1950).
26 For an interpretation of the early English copyright statute where a mere request
to write a book was held to be an "employment" within their statute, see Ward v.
Long, [1906] 2 Ch. 550.
27 260 Mass. 453, 157 N.E. 604 (1927). 28 27 F. 2d 82 (C.A. 6th, 1928).
262 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
may be an implication in favor of the employer. But in the present case the
plaintiff was an independent contractor, rather than an employee; moreover
it may be inferred that the parties did not intend the plaintiff to surrender a
copyright in consideration of a sum less than the bare cost of the work.29
Another case that recognized the possibility of there being a situation
where an author might be an independent contractor was the case of
Harms & Frances v. Stern3" where the court said that there is no reason
why specific performance as to a work in existence cannot be had against
a composer who contracted to assign all the works he might produce in a
period of five years. If the court had viewed such a contract as one of
employment, there would be no need for specific performance, since the
employer would already have had the literary property.
At this point it should be emphasized again that if the contract stipu-
lates that the employer is to have the literary property or the copyright, it
will be given such effect whether the relationship is that of employer-
employee, or that of an independent contractor. 31
CONCLUSION
The problem of who owns the literary property resulting from the
personal service relationship of two contracting parties can be summa-
rized in four short rules:
1. If the contract establishing the relationship is an employment con-
tract in the sense that the employee is subject to the supervision and con-
trol of his employer, and the main purpose of the employment is to pro-
duce the literary property for the employer's benefit, the literary property
will adhere to the employer unless the contract makes some other dispo-
sition of it.
2. If the contract is one of general employment and the literary prop-
erty arises only as incidental to the general employment the ownership
of the literary property will be decided by a consideration of who by the
terms of the contract was entitled to the labor which produced the literary
property.
3. If by a consideration of the contract, the relationship of the author
is that of an independent contractor, the ownership of all literary property
will remain in the independent contractor until he performs his contract,
or is presented with a specific performance decree.
4. If the contract expressly specifies that the literary property is to be
in the employer, it is immaterial whether the author is an employee or an
independent contractor, for the contract will be given effect according to
its terms.
29 Ibid., at page 88. 80 229 Fed. 42 (C.A. 2d, 1915).
31 Edward Thompson Co. v. Clark, 109 N.Y.S. 700 (S. Ct., 1904).
